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Chapter 3 - Black Sites, Lies, and Videotapes
First, several of the tapes were probably broken and blank by this point (as reported in the IG Report). And second, the CIA has more recently said they also did the review to set up an affirmative defense for interrogators, as reflected in Wendy Hilton's description of Doc 60 (which appears to be the January 9 document described as “reflect[ing] the CIA attorney's view on what facts were relevant to determine whether the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah was compliant with law and policy”), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/acluvdod_decl_hilton_09222009.pdf. Hilton noted:
Throughout the CIA's terrorist interrogation program the CIA was concerned that its officers could face civil and criminal liability for their actions. The CIA directed its attorneys to review the record of the first interrogations to ensure that they were conducted consistent with the Department of Justice's guidance, which could arguably provide a defense to possible domestic and international criminal and civil liability. Therefore, while the CIA attorneys may have performed their analysis to determine legal and policy compliance, that analysis was in the context of evaluating possible defenses for anticipated civil and criminal litigation.
Also, note that one of these email exchanges refers to a “leaks memo.”
The day Habibulah was killed, the CIA switched off the video cameras at the black site in Thailand.
Also, it appears that they were never keeping the videotapes from Nashiri, but were instead taping over them (per the description of them in ACLU foiaFOIA from March). So by mid-November, they would have already decided they weren’t keeping these for posterity.
Again, as in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Washington wasn't satisfied:
In a footnote elsewhere in his report, the Inspector General explains the difference between an interrogator and a debriefer:
For two weeks, the “debriefer” who had been flown in from CIA headquarters oversaw this unscripted interrogation. Finally, the debriefer himself, who the Inspector General notes “was not a trained interrogator and was not authorized to use EITs,” took over:
When Congress codified the Convention Against Torture an Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment” in US law in 1994, it specifically cited four acts that would produce the kind of “severe mental pain and suffering” that would be characterized as torture:
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.15
Some might argue that the enemy we face today is more capable in resisting interrogations and a need for harsh (read: torture and abuse) interrogations techniques were required. If Major Sherwood Moran, a Marine during World War II and our country's most famous interrogator, were alive today, he would choke. Consider Imperial Japanese soldiers during World War II -- suicide bombers, blind loyalty to their leader, brutal tactics, brainwashed, dedicated, formidable, aggressive, etc. Major Moran was successful interrogating captured Japanese soldiers because he used relationship building approaches along with his knowledge of Japanese culture (he had been a missionary in Japan for forty years before the start of the war). His axioms that he put to paper in his "Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field" lays out the methods he used to success in interrogating the Japanese -- not one mention of using an enhanced interrogation technique.
Perhaps the most disturbing part of this chapter is not the actual techniques or the cover up of the unlawful use of torture and abuse, but the failure of leadership. Leaders failed to recognize that torture and abuse is inconsistent with American principles and counterproductive to preventing future terrorist attacks. This wisdom is plainly laid out in every version of the Army Field Manual since 1949, but leaders shouldn't need a Field Manual to know that torture and abuse goes against every fabric of what it means to be American.
In probing the gun and drill incident, Helgerson soon discovered that mock executions had been staged several times after they had been specifically excluded from the list of approved interrogation techniques.
The debriefer claimed he did not think he needed to report this incident because the [redacted] had openly discussed this plan [redacted] several days prior to and after the incident. When the debriefer was later [redacted] and believed he needed a non-traditional technique to induce the detainee to cooperate, he told [redacted] he wanted to wave a handgun in front of the detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did not believe he was required to notify Headquarters of this technique, citing the earlier, unreported mock execution [redacted].
A senior operations officer [redacted] recounted that around September 2002 [redacted] heard that the debriefer had staged a mock execution. [Redacted] was not present but understood it went badly; it was transparently a ruse and no benefit was derived from it. [Redacted] observed that there is a need to be creative as long as it is not considered torture. [Redacted] stated that if such a proposal were made now, it would involve a great deal of consultation. It would begin with [redacted] management and would include CTC/Legal, [redacted] and the CTC [redacted].
The [redacted] admitted staging a “mock execution” in the first days that [redacted] was open. According to the [redacted] the technique was his idea but was not effective because it came across as being staged. It was based on the concept, from SERE school, of showing something that looks real, but is not. The [redacted] recalled that a particular CTC interrogator later told him about employing the mock execution technique. The [redacted] did not know when this incident occurred or if it was successful. He viewed this technique as ineffective because it was not believable.
Four [redacted] who were interviewed admitted to either participating in one of the above-described incidents or hearing about them. [Redacted] described staging a mock execution of a detainee. Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the “body” in the aftermath of the ruse “sang like a bird.”
Last week's briefing brought home to me the difficult challenges faced by the Central Intelligence Agency in the current threat environment. I realize we are at a time when the balance between security and liberty must be constantly evaluated and recalibrated in order to protect our nation and its people from catastrophic terrorist attack and I thus appreciate the obvious effort that you and your Office have made to address the tough questions. At the briefing you assured us that the [redacted] approved by the Attorney General have been subject to an extensive review by lawyers at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice and the National Security Council and found to be within the law.
It is also the case, however, that what was described raises profound policy questions and I am concerned about whether these have been as rigorously examined as the legal questions. I would like to know what kind of policy review took place and what questions were examined. In particular, I would like to know whether the most senior levels of the White House have determined that these practices are consistent with the principles and policies of the United States. Have enhanced techniques been authorized and approved by the President?
You discussed the fact that there is videotape of Abu Zubaydah following his capture that will be destroyed after the Inspector General finishes his inquiry. I would urge the Agency to reconsider that plan. Even if the videotape does not constitute an official record that must be preserved under the law, the videotape would be the best proof that the written record is accurate, if such record is called into question in the future. The fact of destruction would reflect badly on the Agency.
Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right….Yet torture continues to be practiced around the world by rogue regimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crush the human spirit….
Notorious human rights abusers…have sought to shield their abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptions and denying access to international human rights monitors….
Results from the first Al Qaeda HVT interrogated using the aforementioned enhanced techniques, Abu Zubayda, have been outstanding. Abu Zubayda reached a satisfactory level of compliance in August 2002. Since April, the interrogation team has produced [redacted] actionable intelligence disseminations from Abu Zubaydah. This has ultimately led to some instances of the US Government being able to neutralize Al Qaeda capabilities worldwide before there was an opportunity for those capabilities to engage in operations harmful to the United States. Because of this, US Government decision makers have a positive view o the program, and there is pressure to increase HVT Interrogation Program capabilities in the shortest time possible.
As the success of the program and of other counter Al Qaeda activities continues to lead to the capture of additional HVT candidates, it can be reasonably expected that intelligence disseminations will lead to even more HVT candidate captures and the likewise increase in demand for more HVT program services.
2.3 Operational Assumptions
Required resources will be approved and available for the HVT Interrogation Program as depicted in Section 4. Such resources are critical to the success of the Program's ability to meet identified customer requirements.
• The impending election
• The brewing scandal at Abu Ghraib (note, DOD knew it was coming in January, and spent a good deal of time trying to convince 60 Minutes not to publish
• The other leaking of memos and whatnot
• The Hamdi and Padilla cases (along with the Administration apparently not being fully forthcoming with Solicitor General's office)
• The 9/11 Commission's attempts to get more detainee information, and the Administration's worries about their report
• Goldsmith's withdrawal, first, of the March 2003 DOD memo—he was prepping to withdraw Bybee One the whole time the IG Report was pending
• The IG Report
• The capture of new detainees and the (possibly trumped) election-eve attack which drove the tension around the torture of Ghailani, Ghul, and others, leading to the 2004 approvals
It'd probably be most readable if you had an introduction to the entire first half of 2004 to talk about all of these currents, then deal with each separately, then show how it all came at once in May to June.
Also, two of the documents that went into this discussion appear to be these:
• A June 4 Tenet request, issued the day after he resigned—note too that there are at least two false pieces of information in the document, when the approval was first given and the briefing to Congress): http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/052708/052708_Other_3.pdf
• And this one, which appears to be Condi's first response to Tenet (she puts him off and says go to DOJ); this is from June 11: http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/06112004_memotociadirector_0.pdf
Also, while it's tangential, on June 29, 2004, John McLaughlin told the 9/11 Commission that CIA had handed over all documents related to detainee interrogation, after a long battle over detainee materials. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/12/zelikow121307.pdf
It appears clear from later issues that Rockefeller was pushing the Agency on whether the program complied with CAT.
It would be useful to deal with the early 2005 events in a similar way to the way I’ve suggested dealing with the spring 2004 events. There are: the ousting of Daniel Levin and his replacement with Bradbury, the 2005 drafting of the Bradbury memos, along with Comey’s objections (and proof that Addington and others were pressuring Bradbury, not to mention making his job contingent on it), the questions in briefings (as well as McCarthy’s accusation that some CIA person lied in briefings), and—very importantly—the debates around what became the Detainee Treatment Act. Remember that Bradbury was already working out a way for torture to be possible even if Congress passed something strengthening CAT, there was a trip to Gitmo that summer for Graham and McCain, Cheney and Goss briefed McCain personally on October 20, and then the Administration started working around McCain to force him to compromise on DTA, basically by leaving “following orders” as a defense. Add in the Brinkema dates (she asks for video on November 3, they tell her they don’t have any on November 14 after they’ve destroyed them). And like the May-June 2004 period, the November 2005 one is one where the Courts are getting nosy, where Congress is pressing for DTA, where CIA/DOJ is lying to Congress about the program again, where the press has a bunch of leaks.
It also would be useful to trace the continuity of Rodriguez and Goss through all of this period: Goss in first Congressional briefing that was likely given by Rodriguez; Goss and Rodriguez both come in in the wake of the Tenet/McLaughlin/Muller resignations after the IG Report, and both involved in the legal discussions to get rid of the tapes. Also, the tape was “rediscovered” in 2007 within two weeks of the time Rodriquez retired. It’d be really useful to trace the continuity of John Rizzo’s involvement, as well.
If past public commentary on the Agency's detention program is any guide, we may see misinterpretations of the facts in the days ahead. With that in mind, I want you to have some background now.
CIA's terrorist detention and interrogation program began after the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002. Zubaydah, who had extensive knowledge of al-Qa'ida personnel and operations, had been seriously wounded in a firefight. When President Bush officially acknowledged in September 2006 the existence of CIA's counter-terror initiative, he talked about Zubaydah, noting that this terrorist survived solely because of medical treatment arranged by CIA. Under normal questioning, Zubaydah became defiant and evasive. It was clear, in the President's words, that "Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking."
That made imperative the use of other means to obtain the information -- means that were lawful, safe, and effective. To meet that need, CIA designed specific, appropriate interrogation procedures. Before they were used, they were reviewed and approved by the Department of Justice and by other elements of the Executive Branch. Even with the great care taken and detailed preparations made, the fact remains that this effort was new, and the Agency was determined that it proceed in accord with established legal and policy guidelines. So, on its own, CIA began to videotape interrogations.
The tapes were meant chiefly as an additional, internal check on the program in its early stages. At one point, it was thought the tapes could serve as a backstop to guarantee that other methods of documenting the interrogations -- and the crucial information they produced -- were accurate and complete. The Agency soon determined that its documentary reporting was full and exacting, removing any need for tapes. Indeed, videotaping stopped in 2002.
As part of the rigorous review that has defined the detention program, the Office of General Counsel examined the tapes and determined that they showed lawful methods of questioning. The Office of Inspector General also examined the tapes in 2003 as part of its look at the Agency's detention and interrogation practices. Beyond their lack of intelligence value -- as the interrogation sessions had already been exhaustively detailed in written channels -- and the absence of any legal or internal reason to keep them, the tapes posed a serious security risk. Were they ever to leak, they would permit identification of your CIA colleagues who had served in the program, exposing them and their families to retaliation from al-Qa'ida and its sympathizers.
These decisions were made years ago. But it is my responsibility, as Director today, to explain to you what was done, and why. What matters here is that it was done in line with the law. Over the course of its life, the Agency's interrogation program has been of great value to our country. It has helped disrupt terrorist operations and save lives. It was built on a solid foundation of legal review. It has been conducted with careful supervision. If the story of these tapes is told fairly, it will underscore those facts.
You said something to the effect that deference is not owed when the government has admitted that what it did was wrong and where there is a tendency sometimes to use classification as a way of avoiding embarrassment. It is a strong argument. But the fact that something was wrong, that it was admitted as wrong, does not change the bar, in my opinion, of deference…
a. The HVD is brought into the interrogation room, and under the direction of the interrogators, stripped of his clothes, and placed into shackles [redacted]
b. The HVD is place standing with his back to the walling wall. The HVD remains hooded.
c. Interrogators approach the HVD, place the walling collar over his head and around his neck, and stand in front of the HVD. [redacted]
d. The interrogators remove the HVD's hood and [redacted] explain the HVD's situation to him, tell him that the interrogators will do what it takes to get important information, and that he can improve his conditions by participating with the interrogators. The insult slap is normally used as soon as the HVD does or says anything inconsistent with the interrogators' instructions.
e. [redacted] If appropriate, an insult slap or abdominal slap will follow.
f. The interrogators will likely use walling once it becomes clear that the HVD is lying, withholding information, or using other resistance techniques.
g. The sequence [redacted] may continue for several more iterations as the interrogators continue to measure the HVD's resistance posture and apply a negative consequence to the HVD's resistance efforts
a. [redacted]. In addition, the medical and psychological personnel observing the interrogations must find no contraindications to continued interrogation.
b. The HVD remains in Sleep deprivation , dietary manipulation and is nude. [redacted]
c. Like the earlier sessions, the HVD begins the session standing against the walling wall with the walling collar around his neck.
d. If the HVD is still maintaining a resistance posture, interrogators will continue to use walling and water dousing. All of the Corrective Techniques ( insult slap, abdominal slap, facial hold, attention grasp ) may be used several times during this session based on the responses and actions of the HVD. Stress positions and wall standing will be integrated into interrogations [redacted] Intense questioning and walling would be repeated multiple times. Interrogators will often use one technique to support another. As an example, interrogators would tell an HVD in a stress position that he (HVD) is going back to the walling wall (for walling) if he fails to hold the stress position until told otherwise by the HVD. This places additional stress on the HVD who typically will try to hold the stress position for as long as possible to avoid the walling wall. [redacted] interrogators will remind the HVD that he is responsible for this treatment and can stop it at any time by cooperating with the interrogators
- 1. Dana Priest, “CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment,” Washington Post , March 3, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/03/24/AR200503...
- 2. 11/20/2009 Vaughn Index, documents 17, 55, 53, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/20091120_Govt_Para_4_55_Hardcopy_Vaughn...
- 3. 11/20/09 Vaughn Index, documents 50, 11, 8, 46
- 4. Final Report of Postmortem Examination, December 8, 2002, available at http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/102405/3146.pdf
- 5. Final Report of Postmortem Examination, December 8, 2002. Within days, another detainee – this one a 22 year-old taxi driver who was incorrectly suspected of involvement in a rocket attack, was murdered by the same group of interrogators at the same facility. These and other homicides will be examined in detail in a later chapter.
- 6. OIG Report, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, September 2001 – October 2003 (CIA Office of the Inspector General Special Review, May 7, 2004), 35, available at http://www.aclu.org/oigreport
- 7. CIA OIG Report, 36, 44
- 8. CIA OIG Report, 44
- 9. CIA OIG Report, 6
- 10. CIA OIG Report, 31-32
- 11. OIG Report, 43. As in the January 2002 incident at Kandahar Detention Facility described in Chapter 2, this was not an isolated, improvised technique. The OIG Report notes: “A CIA officer [redacted] revealed that cigarette smoke was once used as an interrogation technique in October 2002. Reportedly, at the request of [redacted] an interrogator, the officer, who does not smoke, blew the smoke from a thin cigarette/cigar in the detainee's face for about five minutes. The detainee started talking so the smoke ceased. [Redacted] heard that a different officer had used smoke as an interrogation technique.” And “[Redacted] admitted that he has personally used smoke inhalation techniques on detainees to make them ill to the point where they would start to ‘purge.' After this, in a weakened state, these detainees would then provide [redacted] with information.” CIA OIG Report, 72-73
- 12. OIG Report, 44
- 13. In a footnote the OIG explains, “Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to chamber a bullet or simulate a bullet being chambered.”
- 14. [OIG at 42]
- 15. 18 U.S.C. 2340(2)
- 16. OIG Report, 14; see Chapter 2
- 17. Interview with John Helgerson, Der Spiegel , August 31, 2009, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,646010,00.html
- 18. OIG Report, 1-2
- 19. OIG Report, 70-72
- 20. OIG Report, 42-43
- 21. OIG Report, 69
- 22. OIG Report, 2
- 23. Interview with John Helgerson, Der Spiegel , August 31, 2009, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,646010,00.html
- 24. Letter from Jane Harman to Scott Muller, February 10, 2003, available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ca36_harman/Jan_3.shtml
- 25. 11/20/2009 Vaughn Index, documents 32, 28
- 26. Letter from Scott Muller to Jane Harman, February 28, 2003, available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ca36_harman/Jan_3.shtml
- 27. International Committee of The Red Cross, “ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody,” February 2007, 34-35, available at www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf
- 28. ICRC Report, 35
- 29. Despite the death of the detainee at the Salt Pit, “water dousing” was emerging as a preferred technique in the spring of 2002. The Inspector General report, “According to [redacted] and others who worked [redacted] “water dousing” has been used [redacted] since early 2003 when [redacted] officer introduced this technique to the facility. Dousing involves laying a detainee down on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to 15 minutes….A review [redacted] from April and May 2003 revealed that [redacted] sought permission from CTC [redacted] to employ specific techniques for a number of detainees. Included in the list of requested techniques was water dousing. Subsequent cables reported the use and duration of the techniques by detainee per interrogation session. One certified interrogator, noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique, requested CTC to confirm guidelines on water dousing. A return cable directed that the detainee must be placed on a towel or sheet, may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the air temperature must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will not be dried immediately…The DCI Guidelines do not mention water dousing as a technique. The 4 September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines, however, identify ‘water dousing' as one of 12 standard measures that OMS listed, in ascending degree of intensity, as the 11 th standard measure. OMS did not further address ‘water dousing' in its guidelines.” OIG Report, 76
- 30. ICRC Report, 36
- 31. ICRC Report, 36-37
- 32. “…the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench….The individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, the air low is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood. This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulated increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of ‘suffocation and incipient panic,' i.e., the perception of drowning. The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of [12 to 24] inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can with a spout…[T]his procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not drowning. [I] is likely that this procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application.” Memorandum for John Rizzo, August 1, 2002, cited in OIG Report, 21
- 33. OIG Report, 37
- 34. OIG Report, 37
- 35. OIG Report, 21-22
- 36. “Operational Issues Pertaining to the Use of Physical/Psychological Coercion in Interrogation: an Overview,” attached to July 26, 2002 memo from the Joint Recovery Personnel Agency agency to the General Counsel's office of the Department of Defense, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/.../JPRA-Memo_042409.pdf
- 37. OIG Report 83
- 38. OIG Report, 104
- 39. OIG Report 89
- 40. OIG Report 101
- 41. “Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel,” April 28, 2003, available at www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc17.pdf http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc1...
- 42. OIG Report 93-94; full speech available at http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2003_06/alia/...
- 43. Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, “Interrogation Debate Sharply Divided Bush White House,” New York Times, May 4, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/us/politics/04detain.html, and Joby Warrick, “CIA Tactics Endorsed in Secret Memos,” Washington Post, October 15, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR200810...
- 44. OIG Report, 24
- 45. “HVT” is a High Value Target; Document available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/cia_ig/oig29.pdf
- 46. 11/29/09 Vaughn index, document 6
- 47. Scott Shane and Mark Mazetti, “Tapes by C.I.A. Lived and Died to Save Image, New York Times, December 30, 2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D06E6DC1639F933A05751C1A...
- 48. Mark Mazetti and Scott Shane, “Bush Lawyers Discussed Fate of C.I.A. Tapes,” New York Times, December 17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/washington/19intel.html?_r=1&pagewante...
- 49. Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, 292
- 50. Letter from Jack L. Goldsmith III to John Helgerson, May 25, 2004, available at www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc26.pdf
- 51. Letter from Jack L. Goldsmith III to Scott Muller, May 27, 2004, available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc28.pdf
- 52. Dana Priest and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Memo Offered Justification for the Use of Torture,” Washington Post, June 8, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html
- 53. Doc DOJ OLC 001081
- 54. See Joby Warrick, “CIA Tactics Endorsed In Secret Memos,” Washington Post, October 15, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR200810...
- 55. Dana Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,” Washington Post, November 2, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR200511...
- 56. Douglas Jehl, “Report Warned C.I.A. on Tactics In Interrogation, New York Times, November 9, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/politics/09detain.html
- 57. 11/29/09 Vaughn index, documents 3, 5, 2, and 4
- 58. Mark Mazetti, “CIA Destroyed Two Videotapes Depicting Interrogations, New York Times , 12/7/07, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/washington/07intel.html
- 59. Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, “Stonewalled by the C.I.A.,” The New York Times , January 2, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/02/opinion/02kean.html
- 60. Order Regulating Proceedings at 2, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def ., No. 1:04-CV-4151 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2008), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/20080820_ORDER_re_regulating_contempt_.... The CIA tried to argue that because Helgerson's inquiry was a “Review” and not an “Investigation,” and because he never physically had the tapes in his possession, they were not covered by the lawsuit. CIA's Mem. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Contempt and Sanctions at 2, 10-11, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def ., No. 1:04-CV-4151 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/Opposition011008.pdf
- 61. Letter from Lev L. Dessin, Acting United State Attorney, to Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein, March 2, 2009, available at www.aclu.org/pdfs/.../lettertohellerstein_ciainterrogationtapes.pdf
- 62. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., No. 1:04-CV-4151 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009), available at https://www.aclu.org/national-security/transcript-9302009-public-hearing...
- 63. Transcript of 9/30/09 Oral Argument at 24
- 64. Transcript of 9/30/09 Oral Argument at 22-23, 26, 28
- 65. “Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques,” December 30, 2004, 1, available at www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc97.pdf
- 66. “Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques,” 9-10
- 67. “Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques,” 14-15
- 68. “Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques,” 17
- 69. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Fired CIA Officer Believed CIA Lied to Congress,” Washington Post , May 14, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/13/AR200605...
- 70. OIG Report, 42
- 71. “Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel,” April 28, 2003, available at www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc17.pdf; see Dana Priest, “CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment,” Washington Post, March 3, 2005
- 72. Dana Priest, “CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment,” Washington Post, March 3, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2576-2005Mar2.html